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ABSTRACT
Multiagent systemmodels do not typically encompass tools for tack-
ling abnormal or exceptional situations. When a critical situation
arises, and individual agents fail, the system as a whole usually fails,
too. For realizing robust distributed systems, conceived as agent
systems or organizations, it is necessary to keep a right level of sit-
uational awareness (of both agents and environment), through the
introduction of the means for gathering and propagating feedback,
upon which actions can be taken. This work proposes a notion of
accountability that encompasses both a normative dimension, and
a structural dimension, that serves for the purpose of robustness.
KEYWORDS
Accountability; Responsibility; Agent Organizations; Engineering
MAS; Robustness
ACM Reference Format:
Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Roberto Micalizio, and Stefano Tedeschi.
2021. Robustness based on Accountability in Multiagent Organizations.
In Proc. of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2021), Online, May 3–7, 2021, IFAAMAS, 9 pages.
1 INTRODUCTION
Agent organizations (e.g., [2]) are a well-known abstraction for
conceptualizing and developing distributed systems. The organi-
zation metaphor is, in fact, a useful mechanism for modularizing
code spread over different software components that are opaque
and independent of each other. Agent organizations show the same
kind of structure and of advantage that sociologist Dave Elder-Vass
explains for human organizations: an organization provides a struc-
ture of constraints that allow a system consisting of many parts
to act as a whole, with the aim of achieving goals that otherwise
would not be achievable (or not as easily) [25].
Many approaches to multiagent systems and organizations, e.g.
[10, 14, 20, 32], provide the means to design and realize the correct,
expected behavior of the system, capturing exactly what agents
should do to contribute to the achievement of the organizational
goal. For instance, many approaches rely on norms (rules, protocols,
etc.) to define what is expected of each agent and which sanction
is applied when an agent does not comply. Sanctions are intended
as deterrents to prevent norm violation, i.e., to keep the execution
oriented towards the achievement of the organizational goal.
The problem is that when the system faces an abnormal situation
(i.e., a perturbation) and some agent fails to achieve a goal, sanctions
are of little utility, if any [6, 9, 16]. In this case, in fact, the agent may
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have earnestly tried its best to do what expected, but something
which is not under its control hindered the achievement. To have
an intuition, an agent may fail to deliver a parcel because a tree
that fell blocks the only way that allows to reach the recipient.
What is missing in the picture is some support for allowing
agents to provide an account on what happened, propagating it
through appropriately devised structure inside the organization,
for reaching those agents that are equipped with the means for
coping with them. Such a tool aims at making the organization
more robust, that is, capable to keep an acceptable behavior in spite
of unforeseen, abnormal, or stressful conditions. We see robustness
as a crucial property for scaling from agents to agent organizations,
and make a proposal that is based on the concepts of accountability
and responsibility.
Accountability is extremely important in the human world. The
kind of accountability we refer to is well-described in a report by the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) [26]. UNDP’s ac-
countability framework describes organization-wide processes for
monitoring, analyzing, and improving performance in all aspects
of the organization. The framework gives managers the means to
address recurring and systemic issues, and to incorporate lessons
learned into future activities. Inside the framework, accountability
is supported, among other things, by formally documented func-
tions, responsibilities, authority, management expectations, policies,
processes and instruments for improving performance.
Contribution. The main contribution of this paper is a formal
treatment of robustness in multiagent organizations (MAOs), that
permits the specification of a proper treatment of possible pertur-
bations. The proposal is independent of the specific organizational
model. We introduce the notion of accountability, along both its
normative and its structural dimensions, to express who is expected
to provide feedback to whom (and under which circumstances), and
to specify further requirements on how responsibilities should be
distributed in the system. Based upon accountability, we present a
formal treatment of robustness by introducing some key definitions
and properties, and by showing how accountability supports the
system to reaching a consistent state (an acceptable termination
point) despite perturbations. We illustrate the practical use of the
proposal in JaCaMo [12]. Even though we focus on abnormal situa-
tions, the proposal can be extended to reports concerning behavior
in positive cases, a feature that supports compliance to standards
and transparency [8, 9].
2 WORKFLOWS: BACKGROUND
Precedence logic [41], supplies the means for representing possi-
bily complex conditions, that are concerned in accountability. Such
conditions will amount to workflows to which agents participate,
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and that are expected to take place. In general, precedence logic
defines (temporal) expressions that are suitable for describing possi-
ble execution runs of (distributed) system, and relies on the notion
of residuation for tracking the progression of these runs upon the
occurrence of system events. The logic has three primary operators:
‘∨’ (choice), ‘∧’ (interleaving), and ‘·’ (ordering). Ordering allows
constraining the order with which two events must occur, e.g., 𝑎 · 𝑏
means that 𝑎 must occur before 𝑏, but the two events do not need
to occur one immediately after the other. Instead, choice specifies
that at least one of the events should occur, while interleaving that
all should occur but the order is unimportant. The residual of a
workflow𝑢 with respect to an event 𝑒 , denoted as𝑢/𝑒 , is the remain-
der workflow that would be left over when 𝑒 occurs, and whose
satisfaction would guarantee the satisfaction of the workflow 𝑢.
Residual can be calculated by means of a set of rewrite rules. The
following equations are due to Singh (2003). Here, 𝑢 is a workflow,
𝑒 is an event or ⊤, and 𝑒 , the complement of 𝑒 , is also an event.
Initially, neither 𝑒 nor 𝑒 hold. On any run, either 𝑒 or 𝑒 may occur
but not both. Note that we assume that events are nonrepeating.
In practice, we can assume that timestamps differentiate multiple
instances of the same event. Below, Γ𝑢 is the set of literals and their
complements mentioned in 𝑢. Thus, for instance, Γ𝑒 = {𝑒, 𝑒} = Γ𝑒
and Γ𝑒 ·𝑓 = {𝑒, 𝑒, 𝑓 , 𝑓 }.
0/𝑒  0 ⊤/𝑒  ⊤
(𝑟 ∧𝑢)/𝑒  ( (𝑟/𝑒) ∧ (𝑢/𝑒)) (𝑟 ∨𝑢)/𝑒  ( (𝑟/𝑒) ∨ (𝑢/𝑒))
(𝑒 · 𝑟 )/𝑒  𝑟 , if 𝑒 ∉ Γ𝑟 𝑟/𝑒  𝑟 , if 𝑒 ∉ Γ𝑟
(𝑒′ · 𝑟 )/𝑒  0, if 𝑒 ∈ Γ𝑟 (𝑒 · 𝑟 )/𝑒  0
An event 𝑒 is relevant to a workflow 𝑢 if that event is involved
in 𝑢, i.e. 𝑢/𝑒 . 𝑢 [5]. We use the expression 𝑟/(𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) as
a shortcut for ((𝑟/𝑒1)/. . .)/𝑒𝑛 . Finally, let 𝑤 = (𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑘 ) and
𝑧 = (𝑒𝑘+1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) be two sequences of events, 𝑤𝑧 is their con-
catenation (𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑘 , 𝑒𝑘+1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛). We denote by 𝑢 [𝑟 ] the fact
that the workflow 𝑢 contains the sub-workflow 𝑟 . For example, if
𝑢 = 𝑎 ∧ (𝑏 · 𝑐), we can write 𝑢 [𝑏 · 𝑐] because of 𝑏 · 𝑐 is contained
in 𝑢. Of course, we have that ∀𝑢 : 𝑢 [𝑢]; i.e., a workflow is trivially
a sub-workflow of itself. Moreover, we denote by 𝑢 → 𝑢 ′ the fact
that for any (𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) such that 𝑢/(𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) = ⊤ we also have
that 𝑢 ′/(𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) = ⊤.
Example 1 (Yoghurt production line). Let us consider an auto-
mated yoghurt production line: a robotic arm takes a cup from the
storage and places it on a conveyor belt while a filler is placed in
correspondence to the final position of the cup. The cup is, then,
filled and finally the lid is put on it. This workflow can be modeled
as: production =(takeCup ∧ enableFiller) · fillCup · putLid.
3 A MODEL OF ROBUST MAO
The notion of accountability has recently gained the attention of
many authors (see e.g., [3, 16, 19]), who see a powerful software
engineering tool in it. We agree and add that accountability is fun-
damental to design and realize robust, agent systems. Alderson and
Doyle (2010) say on robustness: “A [property] of a [system] is robust
if it is [invariant] with respect to a [set of perturbations].” Brackets
are original and emphasize that a formal treatment of robustness
requires a proper system specification. In other terms, robustness is
primarily a matter of good design, which in turn demands for proper
engineering tools. We see in accountability such a tool. Taking as
references the conceptual models of organizations and institutions
discussed in [12, 21–23, 27, 32, 43], we have distilled a minimal
conceptual model, in Figure 1, where white boxes represent the
concepts commonly underpinning social models.
3.1 Norms, Roles, Responsibilities, Sanctions,
Tasks
Following the cited works, where the society is shaped by a set of
norms, that create social expectations through, e.g., commitments,
authorizations, prohibitions [42], we introduce the concept of Norm.
Norms can yield obligations about the tasks that agents are held
to fulfill; they are, therefore, used to describe the ideal behavior of
agents in terms of their responsibilities, rights and duties [34]. Many
methodologies for agent organizations (e.g., [22, 32, 43]) hinge on
the concepts of Task and of Responsibility about some Task. So,
in Gaia [43], the functionality of a role is defined by its responsibil-
ities. The OperA framework [22] is able to define the global aims
of an organization (tasks), and the objectives and responsibilities
of its participants. A similar idea recurs in other frameworks, such
as OMNI [23] and MOISE [32], where a functional decomposition
describes how a complex goal (task) can be achieved in a distributed
way. Agents joining the organization are expected to contribute by
achieving subgoals of such a decomposition, whenever obligations
are triggered by the organization toward them. In MOISE, agents
are held to explicitly commit to missions (i.e., subsets of goals), this
act implies an assumption of responsibility of the agents toward
their missions and, hence, the acceptance of the related obligations
that will be issued by the organization.
In short, all these frameworks see responsibility as duties that
an agent has to accomplish while in an organization, and use obli-
gations as a mechanism for telling agents how to discharge their
responsibilities, accomplishing their tasks. The agent autonomy
is preserved, since agents can reason about the normative system,
and hence can deliberate how to act to trigger obligations, or they
can even decide not to satisfy an obligation despite being possibly
sanctioned. Thus, norms originate responsibilities in organizations
[27], as well as in institutions [34], and responsibilities aggregate
the tasks that can be performed within the society. Norms are also
associated with Sanction, that can be imposed to agents when they
violate some norm. A Rolemodels, through norms, the powers and
duties of its players. An Agent can adopt/leave a Role, commit/leave
a Responsibility, and can achieve/fail a Task by internalizing it
as a goal of its own. We assume agents to be autonomous, thus, we
require them to explicitly commit to their responsibilities.
In the following, we model complex tasks as workflows, or pro-
cesses, expressed in precedence logic (see Section 2), and denote
as R(𝑥,𝑢) that 𝑥 has the responsibility for task 𝑢. By way of R(·) it
is possible to impose requirements on the distribution of responsi-
bilities among the agents that will constitute an organization. We
assume that each agent, taking part to a workflow, takes on the re-
sponsibility for the portion of the same workflow that it is expected
to execute. We assume responsibility to be invariant with respect to
the occurrence of events. R𝑢 denotes a distribution of responsibility
over a workflow 𝑢. It amounts to a set of responsibilities of form
R(𝑥,𝑢 ′), such that 𝑢 [𝑢 ′].






































Figure 1: The proposed conceptual model of robust multi-agent organizations.
Definition 1 (Simplest responsibility coverage). Given a
workflow 𝑢, we say that a responsibility distribution R𝑢 is a simplest
responsibility coverage of 𝑢 iff for each 𝑢 ′ such that 𝑢 [𝑢 ′] and 𝑢 ′ is
atomic there exists 𝑟 ∈ R𝑢 such that 𝑟 = R(𝑥,𝑢 ′) for some 𝑥 .
Intuitively, a simplest responsibility coverage over 𝑢 assures that
there is some agent who is in charge of each atomic step in 𝑢.
3.2 Recovery Strategies, Accountability
Agreements, Request and Account Specs
In the proposedmodel, robustness relies on the concept of Recovery
Strategy. Robustness is obtained by making the system tolerant
to perturbations for which an adequate treatment is known. A
Recovery Strategy connects the account for a perturbation with
a Treatment Task that can properly tackle it. Note that Treatment
Task may be optional in a recovery strategy. The rationale is that
it may not be necessary to treat all perturbations: in some situa-
tions, we just want to raise awareness of it. Since a Treament Task
is a Task, its related Responsibility can be assinged to a Role.
Consequently, obligations can be created concerning its execution.
Building upon sociology literature [24, 28, 39], in agent orga-
nizations (e.g., [3, 19]), accountability is often seen as a mutually
accepted social relationship between two parties such that (1) one
of the parties (“account taker” or a-taker) can legitimately demand,
under certain conditions, an account about a process of interest,
and (2) the other (“account giver” or a-giver) is legitimately re-
quired to provide the account. In accountability, we recognize two
dimensions:
• The normative dimension creates mutual expectations on the
behavior of the involved agents; it captures the legitimacy,
for the account taker, of asking (and the availability of the
account giver to provide) an account (the standing of the
account taker to demand an account).
• The structural dimension concerns the capability to produce
an account; for being held to account about a process, an
agent must exert control over the same process and must
have proper awareness of the situation it accounts for, possi-
bly by relying on other agents.
We will use the expression accountability agreement for talk-
ing about the normative dimension, while accountability structure
will refer to the structural dimension while accountability will en-
compass both dimensions. The former is captured by the concept
Accountability Agreement, while the latter, together with the
complete definition of accountability, will be introduced in Sec-
tion 4.1 by specifying structural properties that must hold.
Formally, we represent an Accountability Agreement as AA(𝑥,
𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢). Here, 𝑥 and 𝑦 are agents, while 𝑟 and 𝑢 are expressed in
precedence logic because they refer to workflows of tasks, that
are expected to occur during the interaction due to some social
norms. When 𝑟 holds, two conditions should be implied: (1) 𝑦 has
the claim-right to ask 𝑥 for an account about 𝑢; and (2) 𝑥 is actu-
ally in condition to provide substantive and authoritative accounts
about𝑢. This happens when 𝑥 can retrieve the necessary contextual
information about𝑢, either because the agent is directly responsible
for the execution of 𝑢, or because it can rely on other agents to
gather feedback on the execution of (all the parts of) 𝑢. While the
first condition is implied by the normative dimension of the ac-
countability, the second condition is only achieved by imposing an
adequate structure to the set of defined accountability agreements.
Note that an Accountability Agreement does not imply that 𝑥
will bring about 𝑢, but only that 𝑥 can produce an account about 𝑢,
possibly by relying on accounts provided by other agents.
The association between Accountability Agreement and Task
captures the object of the account. That is, the a-giver is expected
to produce an account that is relevant for the task indicated via
this association. In our formal representation of an agreement, this
corresponds to the process 𝑢, for which 𝑥 is capable of producing
accounts, as discussed.
RequestSpec specifies the kind of the request the a-taker can
make. It is characterized by a can-request-when field (mapping
condition 𝑟 ), that specifieswhen an account request is legitimate, i.e.,
when the a-taker has permission of asking for an account. The as-
sociation between Accountability Agreement and Requesting
Task specifies who will serve the purpose of being a-taker, that is,
the one who is responsible for the Requesting Task. Note that,
in some cases, an account request is the result of an internal delib-
eration of the a-taker: asking for an account is just a local goal of
the a-taker, and has not a corresponding task at the social level. In
other circumstances, instead, an agent might have the duty (i.e., an
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obligation) to handle a situation of interest, and hence to ask for an
account about that condition.
The concept AccountSpec, characterized by a must-accoun-
t-with field, captures the type of knowledge that the a-giver feeds
back to the a-taker upon request. The association between Accoun-
tability Agreement and Accounting Task specifies who will
serve the purpose of being a-giver, that is, the one who is responsi-
ble for the Accounting Task.
We assume that accountability agreements are preserved at run-
time. Given AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢), we define its progression against the oc-
currence of an event 𝑒 as AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)/𝑒 = AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢). When
𝑟/𝑒 progresses to ⊤, 𝑦 is legitimated to ask 𝑥 for an account, and 𝑥
is required upon request, to provide 𝑦 with an account of 𝑢. On the
contrary, when 𝑟/𝑒 progresses to 0, the accountability agreement
is withdrawn. Notably, events make progress only 𝑟 , whereas 𝑢,
the object of the account, remains unchanged. The point is that
𝑟 determines when an account request is legitimate (or even no
longer possible). On the other hand, 𝑢, which is independent of 𝑟 ,
determines the set of possible accounts, including errors. The two
conditions, thus, have a substantially different nature.
Finally, accountability agreements and recovery strategies bring
along normative expectations that can be formulated according to
the normative layer (Norm). So, for instance, they can be grafted both
on top of approaches that rely on “permissions” and “obligations”,
like [11], and on top of frameworks that exploit social commitments
[16, 40]. To our aims, it is not necessary to make any assumption
on the selected realization, so we will stick to the abstraction level
of accountability agreements. Thus, we add at conceptual level a
dashed link between Accountability Agreement and Norm, to
underline that there exists a tight bound between agreements and
norms, but leave the choice of how to concretize agreements at the
implementation level.
4 ROBUSTNESS UPON ACCOUNTABILITY
Rephrasing Alderson and Doyle (2010), a process𝑢 is robust to some
perturbation, when 𝑢 includes some kind of recovery that allows 𝑢
to terminate smoothly despite the occurrence of the perturbation
(i.e., to terminate leaving the system in a “consistent” state). We will
see that, in order to allow recovery, agents will produce and return
accounts that witness what happened to disrupt the execution – e.g.,
the complement of some expected event occurred, or two events
occurred in the wrong order.
Definition 2 (Account). Given a workflow 𝑢:
• An account for 𝑢 is a sequence of events 𝑢 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . . , 𝑒𝑛),
such that for each 𝑒𝑖 , 𝑢/𝑒𝑖 ≠ 𝑢 (the event 𝑒𝑖 is relevant for 𝑢).
• An account 𝑢! = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) witnesses a perturbation for 𝑢
when 𝑢/(𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) = 0.
We denote as←−𝑢! a recovery event based on the account 𝑢!.
With reference to the model,
←−𝑢! amounts to the outcome of the
Treatment Task, associated with the Recovery Strategy. Note
that an account is not the perturbation it witnesses; if needed,
perturbations could be identified by approaches like [36].
Robustness is a property that a system has, or has not. It concerns
a perturbation and requires the existence of appropriate handlers,
i.e., recovery strategies foreseen at an organizational level, which
the agent, receiving the perturbation account, should activate for
bringing the system to an acceptable state. Specifically, Proposi-
tion 1 (below) states that a workflow is robust to a perturbation,
when it includes a recovery strategy, that can deal with the per-
turbation account so as to bring the workflow to an acceptable
termination state. Formally, a recovery strategy for a workflow
𝑢 for a perturbation with account 𝑢! = (𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛) is the work-
flow ℎ(𝑢!) = 𝑒1 · . . . · 𝑒𝑛 · ←−𝑢! . If the workflow 𝑢 is perturbed with
the account 𝑢, the workflow 𝑢 ∨ ℎ(𝑢!) is not. More importantly,
𝑢 ∨ ℎ(𝑢!)/(𝑢!,←−𝑢! ) = ⊤; that is, when a perturbation is followed by
an account describing its context and a suitable recovery event,
the system terminates in a consistent state. More generally, we can
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Robustness to a perturbation). Let 𝑢 be a
workflow such that 𝑢 [𝑣], where 𝑣 is perturbed with the account 𝑣!.
Let 𝑤 and 𝑧, be two sequences of events, such that 𝑢/𝑤𝑡𝑧 = ⊤ and
𝑣/𝑡 = ⊤, for some sequence 𝑡 . We have that (𝑢 ∨ ℎ(𝑣!))/𝑤𝑡 ′𝑧 = ⊤,
where 𝑡 ′ = (𝑣!,←−𝑣! ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of 𝑢.
If 𝑢 ≡ 𝑣 , then 𝑤 and 𝑧 are empty, and we just need to prove
that (𝑣 ∨ ℎ(𝑣!))/𝑡 ′ = ⊤. This, however, follows directly from the
definition of recovery strategy since ℎ(𝑣!) = 𝑒1 · . . . · 𝑒𝑛 ·←−𝑣! = 𝑣! ·←−𝑣! ,
and 𝑡 ′ = (𝑣!,←−𝑣! ) by hypothesis. Thus, (𝑣∨ℎ(𝑣!))/𝑡 ′ = 𝑣/𝑡 ′∨ℎ(𝑣!)/𝑡 ′;
the first disjunct progresses to 0 whereas the second to ⊤.
In the general case, 𝑣 . 𝑢, and 𝑢 [𝑣]. Suppose that 𝑢 = 𝑎 ∧ 𝑢 ′
and 𝑢 ′[𝑣]. By inductive hypothesis (𝑢 ′ ∨ ℎ(𝑣!))/𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 = ⊤, where
𝑤 = 𝑎𝑤 ′. By progression, we have (𝑎 ∧ 𝑢 ′ ∨ ℎ(𝑣!))/𝑎𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 =
(𝑎∧𝑢 ′)/𝑎𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 ∨ ℎ(𝑣!)/𝑎𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 = (𝑎/𝑎𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 ∧𝑢 ′/𝑎𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧) ∨ ℎ(𝑣!)/
𝑎𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 = (⊤ ∧𝑢 ′/𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧) ∨ℎ(𝑣!)/𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 =𝑢 ′/𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧∨ℎ(𝑣!)/𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 =
(𝑢 ′∨ℎ(𝑒!))/𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧. By inductive hypothesis (𝑢 ′∨ℎ(𝑣!))/𝑤 ′𝑡 ′𝑧 = ⊤.
The cases ∨ and · are similar. The proof can be generalized for
any workflow preceding and following 𝑢 ′ in 𝑢. □
It is worth noting that when the perturbation does not occur,
we still have that (𝑢 ∨ ℎ(𝑣!))/𝑤𝑡𝑧 = ⊤ because 𝑢/𝑤𝑡𝑧 = ⊤. In the
above proposition, we have made the simplifying assumption that
ℎ(𝑣!) is not pertubed by other perturbations. This assumption can
be relaxed by introducing further recovery strategies, one for each
perturbation affecting ℎ(𝑣!). This could be repeated indefinitely
specifying recovery strategies for perturbations affecting recovery
strategies. In practice the designer has to put a limit to the depth of
this chain of perturbation handlers.
4.1 Accountability
Wenow explain how, by relying on Proposition 1, accountability can
be used as an infrastructure for ensuring robustness against known
perturbations. First of all, we need to characterize the accounts.
Accountability, in fact, exists only when the agent providing an
account is aware of the process it is accounting for, and has access
to all the relevant information, possibly by gathering accounts
from others. We thus say that the account is sound. To guarantee
sound accounts, we define accountability on top of responsibility
statements R(·) by means of accountability structure (A-structure).
Definition 3 (A-structure). Let R be a responsibility distribu-
tion, an A-structure over R is a pair ⟨𝐴,𝑇 ⟩, where:
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• 𝐴 is a set of accountability agreements {AA(𝑥1, 𝑦1, 𝑟1, 𝑢1), . . . ,
AA(𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛, 𝑟𝑛, 𝑢𝑛)};
• 𝑇 is either:
– a set {R(𝑥1, 𝑢1), . . . ,R(𝑥𝑛, 𝑢𝑛)} ⊆ R, such that for each
accountability agreement AA(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 ) ∈ 𝐴, there is a
corresponding responsibility R(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 ) ∈ 𝑇 . This kind of A-
structure is named A-leaf;
– a set of A-structures.
A-leaves represents one-step accounts: situations where the
agent providing an account about a workflow is also responsible
for the very same workflow, and this guarantees the provision of
a sound account. Accountability characterizes A-structures so as
to provide the same guarantee even when an agent accounts for
workflows for which it is not directly responsible. To this aim, we
define the following two operations upon A-structures.
Definition 4 (A-union). The A-union between two A-structures,
denoted by ⟨𝐴1,𝑇1⟩ ⊕ ⟨𝐴2,𝑇2⟩, is either:
• ⟨𝐴1 ∪ 𝐴2,𝑇1 ∪ 𝑇2⟩, if both the A-structures are A-leaves, or
none of them is an A-leaf;
• ⟨𝐴1∪𝐴2,𝑇1∪{⟨𝐴2,𝑇2⟩}⟩, if ⟨𝐴2,𝑇2⟩ is an A-leaf and ⟨𝐴1,𝑇1⟩
is not;
• ⟨𝐴1∪𝐴2,𝑇2∪{⟨𝐴1,𝑇1⟩}⟩, if ⟨𝐴1,𝑇1⟩ is an A-leaf and ⟨𝐴2,𝑇2⟩
is not.
Definition 5 (A-join). The A-join between two A-structures,
denoted by ⟨𝐴1,𝑇1⟩ ⊗ ⟨𝐴2,𝑇2⟩, is recursively defined as follows:
• ⟨𝐴1,𝑇1⟩ ⊕ ⟨𝐴2,𝑇2⟩, if ⟨𝐴1,𝑇1⟩ and ⟨𝐴2,𝑇2⟩ are A-leaves;
• ⟨𝐴1 ∪𝐴2, {𝑡𝑖 ⊗ 𝑡 𝑗 ,∀(𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ∈ 𝑇1 ×𝑇2}⟩, otherwise.
We can define accountability as follows.
Definition 6 (Accountability). Let 𝑢 be a workflow and let R𝑢
be a distribution of responsibility, an accountability A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) over
R𝑢 is an A-structure ⟨{AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)},𝑇 ⟩ defined as follow:
• 𝑇 is {R(𝑥,𝑢)}, such that R(𝑥,𝑢) ∈ R𝑢 ;
• A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) = AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) + A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟,𝑢);
• A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′ ∨ 𝑢 ′′) = A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′) ∨ A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′′);
• A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′ ∧ 𝑢 ′′) = A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′) ∧ A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′′);
• A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′ · 𝑢 ′′) = A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′) · A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟 · 𝑢 ′, 𝑢 ′′).
Where the operations +, ∨, ∧, and · on accountabilities are defined
as follows, supposing A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′) = ⟨𝐴𝑢′,𝑇𝑢′⟩, A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′′) =
⟨𝐴𝑢′′,𝑇𝑢′′⟩, A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟,𝑢) = ⟨𝐴𝑢 ,𝑇𝑢⟩:
• AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) + A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟,𝑢) = ⟨{AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)}, {⟨𝐴𝑢 ,𝑇𝑢⟩}⟩;
• A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′) ∨ A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′′) = ⟨{AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′ ∨ 𝑢 ′′)},
{⟨𝐴𝑢′,𝑇𝑢′⟩ ⊕ ⟨𝐴𝑢′′,𝑇𝑢′′⟩}⟩;
• A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′) ∧ A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′′) = ⟨{AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′ ∧ 𝑢 ′′)},
{⟨𝐴𝑢′,𝑇𝑢′⟩ ⊗ ⟨𝐴𝑢′′,𝑇𝑢′′⟩}⟩;
• A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′) · A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟 · 𝑢 ′, 𝑢 ′′) = ⟨{AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′ · 𝑢 ′′)},
{⟨𝐴𝑢′,𝑇𝑢′⟩ ⊗ ⟨𝐴𝑢′′,𝑇𝑢′′⟩}⟩.
We use 𝐴𝑢 as a shortcut for a singleton set {AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)} for some
agents 𝑥 and 𝑦, and some condition 𝑟 and workflow 𝑢.
Example 2. In the yoghurt production example, let’s consider re-
sponsibility distribution R = {R(𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐴𝑟𝑚, takeCup), R(𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔-
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟, enableFiller), R(𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟, fillCup), R(𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟, putLid)}. We
define the accountability of the 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 agent towards a 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴-
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 about yoghurt production, overR as:A(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡,
⊤, production). By Definition 6, this amounts to 𝑎1 · 𝑎2 where 𝑎1 =
A(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟,𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡,⊤, (takeCup∧enableFiller) · fillCup) and
𝑎2 = A(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡, (takeCup ∧ enableFiller) · fillCup,
putLid). Again by Definition 6, 𝑎1 can be decomposed as 𝑎3 · 𝑎4,
where 𝑎3 = A(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡, ⊤, takeCup ∧ enableFiller),
and 𝑎4 = A(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡, takeCup ∧ enableFiller, fill-
Cup). Focusing on 𝑎4, we have that 𝑎4 = AA(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡,
takeCup∧ enableFiller, fillCup) + 𝑎5, where 𝑎5 is A(𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟 -
𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟, takeCup ∧ enableFiller, fillCup). Here, the accountability
agreement between 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 and 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 w.r.t. fillCup is sup-
ported by 𝑎5, in which 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 is a-taker and 𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 is a-giver.
Notice also that 𝑎5 is an A-leaf since 𝑎5 = ⟨{AA(𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖-
𝑠𝑜𝑟, takeCup ∧ enableFiller, fillCup)}, {R(𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟, fillCup)}⟩ thanks
to the initial responsibility distribution R. The structure of account-
ability ensures that 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 will be in condition to receive an
authoritative account about fillCup from the 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 . Despite
not being directly involved in the task, 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 can recursively
gather an account thanks to the 𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 ’s accountability. The same
construction can be applied to the steps in the production workflow.
Definition 6 says accountability is a tree by construction, whose
nodes have form A(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑢) =⟨{AA(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑢)},𝑇𝑢⟩. AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) is
an accountability agreement, and𝑇𝑢 is the structure through which
a sound account of 𝑢 can be delivered to 𝑥 . Grounding the tree
over responsibility statements (A-leaves), assures that each agent,
involved in the structure, has the means for gaining situational
awareness of the process it is concerned with. So, it can provide
sound accounts. We formalize this as a property of accountable
workflows.
Definition 7 (Feedback chain). A feedback chain is a sequence
of ⟨A(𝑥0, 𝑦0, 𝑟0, 𝑢0), . . . ,A(𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛, 𝑟𝑛, 𝑢𝑛)⟩ such that for each 𝑖 = 1, . . .,
𝑛, we have that 𝑢𝑖−1 [𝑢𝑖 ], 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖−1, and 𝑟𝑖 → 𝑟𝑖−1.
Proposition 2 (Accountable workflow). Let 𝑢 be a work-
flow and let A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) be an accountability over R𝑢 . There exists
a feedback chain ⟨A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢), . . . ,A(𝑥 ′, 𝑦′, 𝑟 ′, 𝑢 ′)⟩ for any work-
flow 𝑢 ′ such that 𝑢 [𝑢 ′]. We call 𝑢 an accountable workflow through
A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) over R𝑢 .
Proof. Let us denote as 𝑆𝑇 (A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)) the syntax tree of the
workflow on A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢). The proof is by induction on the depth
of the syntax tree 𝑆𝑇 (A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)).
In the case of depth 1, A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) is ⟨{AA(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑢)}, {R(𝑥,𝑢)}⟩,
where 𝑢 is atomic, and the chain is given by ⟨A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)⟩.
If the depth is 𝑛. In case 𝑢 is 𝑢1 ∧ 𝑢2, then A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢1 ∧ 𝑢2) =
A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢1) ∧ A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢2). Since by hypothesis 𝑢 [𝑢 ′], then we
have either𝑢1 [𝑢 ′] or𝑢2 [𝑢 ′]. Let us assume𝑢1 [𝑢 ′]. By inductive hy-
pothesis, for anyworkflow𝑢 ′ such that𝑢1 [𝑢 ′] there exists ⟨A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟 ,
𝑢1), . . . ,A(𝑥 ′, 𝑦′, 𝑟 ′, 𝑢 ′)⟩. Now, if we substitute the first element of
this chain with A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢), we get again feedback chain. In fact,
by initial hypothesis A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) is an A-framework, and by con-
struction 𝑢 [𝑢1 [𝑢 ′]] holds. The cases ∨ and · are similar.
Finally, in caseA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) = AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) +A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟,𝑢), we have
by inductive hypothesis, for any workflow 𝑢 ′ such that 𝑢 [𝑢 ′] there
exists ⟨A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟,𝑢), . . . ,A(𝑥 ′, 𝑦′, 𝑟 ′, 𝑢 ′)⟩. Thus, the sequence ⟨A(𝑥 ,
𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢), A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟,𝑢), . . . ,A(𝑥 ′, 𝑦′, 𝑟 ′, 𝑢 ′)⟩ is again a feedback chain,
and this proves the proposition. □
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Proposition 2 guarantees that, given a workflow 𝑢, it is possible
to define a proper set of feedback chains, from a-givers to the
corresponding a-takers, for every sub-workflow of 𝑢. Thanks to
responsibility, a-givers are the agents that are competent for each
subprocess of 𝑢, and hence can provide sound accounts.
Example 3. With reference to Example 2, thanks to A(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖-
𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡,⊤, production) overR, we can see that production is
an accountable workflow. For each subworkflow, due to the respon-
sibilities in R and to the structure imposed by the accountability, it
is possible to find a suitable feedback chain. For instance, for fillCup,
the feedback chain is: ⟨A(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟,𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡,⊤, production),
A(𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟, takeCup ∧ enableFiller, fillCup)⟩.
Accountability is preserved at runtime with respect to the events
that occur during the execution.
Proposition 3 (Accoutability persistency). Let 𝑢 be a work-
flow and let R𝑢 be a responsibility distribution. Given A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)
over R𝑢 and an event 𝑒 such that 𝑟/𝑒 ≠ 0, we have that A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢)
holds over R𝑢 .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure ofA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢).
In the base case,A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) is an A-leaf ⟨{AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)}, {R(𝑥,𝑢)}⟩.
By definition of progression on AA(·), it follows that A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢)/𝑒
= ⟨{AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢)}, {R(𝑥,𝑢)}⟩ = A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢): the awareness of
the agent 𝑥 does not change after the progression of the context 𝑟
under the occurrence of event 𝑒 .
In the general case, we distinguish two situations. First, let A(𝑥,
𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑢) be A(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑢 ′) 𝑜𝑝 A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′′) (where 𝑜𝑝 ∈ {∨,∧, ·}),
and by inductive hypothesis let A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢 ′) and A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢 ′′)
hold. It follows immediately that also A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢) holds. Second,
let A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) be AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) + A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟,𝑢), also in this case the
thesis follows directly by the inductive hypothesis AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢)
and A(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑟/𝑒,𝑢). □
4.2 Robustness through Accountability
Proposition 3 assures that accountability is preserved against pro-
gression. Thus, this is exactly the structure upon which a robustness
property can be put in effect. Intuitively, when a workflow is robust
to a perturbation with account 𝑣!, not only there exists a specific
recovery strategy ℎ(𝑣!) = 𝑣! · ←−𝑣! , but, thanks to accountability, it is
also guaranteed that the account of the perturbation will actually
be available. By providing the account 𝑣! we get two results: first, it
is possible to notify the repairing agent that something wrong has
occurred, and a repair is needed; second, it is possible to provide
the repairing agent with information that help understand how
to handle the situation. This is important when agents, as often
happens, do not have a complete view of events. The illustration
with JaCaMo, in the next section, exploits this feature.
Proposition 4 (Account Availability). Let 𝑢 = 𝑢 ′∨ℎ(𝑣!) be a
workflow such that 𝑢 ′[𝑣], and let 𝑣! be the account for a perturbation
on 𝑣 . Let R𝑢 be a distribution of responsibility, such that R(𝑦,𝑢)
belongs to R𝑢 . If 𝑢 ′ is an accountable workflow through A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′)
over R𝑢 , then the account is available to the agent 𝑦 in charge of the
recovery strategy for the perturbation.
Proof. The proof follows directly from propositions 1 and 2.
From Proposition 1, we have that a workflow 𝑢 ′ such that 𝑢 ′[𝑣]
is robust to a perturbation with account 𝑣! if a dedicated recovery
strategy ℎ(𝑣!) = 𝑣! · ←−𝑣! is activated instead of 𝑢 ′ when 𝑣! occurs. On
the other hand, the account 𝑣! must be generated somewhere in the
system. This is granted by Proposition 2: since 𝑢 ′ is an accountable
workflow, there is always the chance to generate an account for any
of its sub-workflow, including 𝑣 , even when it is perturbed. There
exists, in fact, a feedback chain ⟨A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢 ′), . . . ,A(𝑥 ′, 𝑦′, 𝑟 ′, 𝑣)⟩,
where the account 𝑣! is first generated by 𝑥
′
and then propagated
to 𝑦, responsible for the whole workflow 𝑢 = 𝑢 ′ ∨ ℎ(𝑣!). □
Example 4. Let us consider a perturbation outOfStock, concern-
ing putLid, and a corresponding recovery event orderProduct. We
can extend the responsibility distribution R so as to make the pro-
duction workflow robust by adding the responsibility R(𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖-
𝑠𝑜𝑟, orderProduct) and turning the workflow into (production ∨
orderProduct) – 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 will also be in charge of the treatment.
Should a perturbation outOfStock occur, by way of the new respon-
sibilities, an account would be provided by 𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 to 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 ; this,
in turn, would exploit the account for activating a recovery strategy.
5 ILLUSTRATION IN JACAMO
JaCaMo [12] is a conceptual model and programming platform
that integrates agents (programmed in Jason [13]), environments
(programmed in CArtAgO [38]) and organizations (programmed
in Moise [32]). A Moise organization has three dimensions. The
structural dimension specifies roles, groups and links between roles
in the organization. The functional dimension is made of schemes,
which elicit how the global organizational goal is decomposed into
subgoals, and how subgoals are grouped in coherent sets, called
missions – to be distributed to the agents. The normative dimension
binds the two previous dimensions by specifying permissions and
obligations that are associated with each role. At the beginning of
the execution the agents, playing the different roles, are asked to
commit to certain missions, as specified by the norms. The organi-
zation will then issue obligations to achieve mission goals to the
committed agents to coordinate the distributed execution.
On this basis, similarly to what done in JaCaMo+ for commit-
ments [4], we map the concepts of Mission and Goal from JaCaMo
onto the concepts of Responsibility and Task of the proposed
conceptual model, Figure 1. We interpret the agent’s commitment
to a mission as an assumption of responsibility. Indeed, in JaCaMo
agents commit to missions before pursuing (part of) the organiza-
tional goal and, from that moment on, the organization can issue
obligations towards them to make them achieve the mission goals.
To fulfill an obligation about a mission goal, an agent maps it into
an internal goal, and tries to satisfy it. By accomplishing such an
internal goal, the agent carries out the task the organization de-
manded by issuing the obligation. Hence, achieving that internal
goal amounts to achieving the original mission goal.
In order to represent and interpret norms, JaCaMo uses the Nor-
mative Programming Language (NPL) [31] A norm in this language
has the following syntax: norm 𝑖𝑑 : 𝜑 -> 𝜓 , where 𝑖𝑑 is an iden-
tifier of the norm, 𝜑 is the activation condition of the norm, and
𝜓 is the consequence of the norm. A consequence can either be
the issue of an obligation, or a failure. The former is used to raise
obligations toward agents about goals to be achieved. The latter
is used to model regimented norms; e.g., conditions that are not
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allowed. Intuitively, when 𝜙 is fail, any agent action that makes
𝜑 true will fail, too (and no change in the organization occurs).
We have seen that accountability A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢) is a pair ⟨{AA(𝑥,
𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑢)}, 𝑇𝑢⟩ where the AA(.) captures an agreement, and amounts
to the normative dimension, while 𝑇𝑢 captures the structure sup-
porting the agreement. In order to introduce robustness through
accountability inside JaCaMo, we now map the normative dimen-
sion of accountability within the normative system of the organiza-
tion. For what concerns the structural dimension, this is a property
that can be verified by assessing whether, given a distribution of
responsibilities (i.e., a set of JaCaMo missions), it holds that for
each obligation that 𝑥 has about accounting on 𝑢, 𝑥 has the means
for generating an account either because it is directly responsible,
or thanks to other accounts that 𝑥 is legitimated to ask to other
agents, and so forth recursively. As explained, responsibility is not
directly represented in JaCaMo, but we can see the commitment to
a mission as a declaration of responsibility assumption.
Normative dimension. We can realize the normative dimension
of accountability by defining suitable norms in NPL. The obligation
to provide an account, induced by an accountability agreement
AA(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟,𝑢), is generated by the following norm.
1 norm nAccountProduct ion :
2 a c c oun t ab i l i t yAg r e emen t ( Request_u , Account_u , R ) & R &
3 r e qu e s t ( Request_u , Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) &
4 account ( Account_u , Account ing_goa l_u ) &
5 done ( S , Reques t ing_goa l_u , Y ) &
6 mi s s i on_goa l (M1 , Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) & committed ( S ,M1 , Y ) &
7 mi s s i on_goa l (M2 , Account ing_goa l_u ) & committed ( S ,M2 , X )
8 −> o b l i g a t i o n ( X , enab l ed ( S , Account ing_goa l_u ) ,
9 done ( S , Account ing_goa l_u , X ) , . . . ) .
The norm specifies that, when 𝑦 is legitimated to ask an ac-
count about 𝑢 to 𝑥 in 𝑟 , an obligation towards 𝑥 to achieve goal
Accounting_goal_u is issued. Accounting_goal_u will make 𝑥
provide 𝑦 with the requested account. Legitimation is due to the
fact that there exists a suitable accountability agreement for the
current context 𝑟 (Lines 2-4), 𝑦 asks for the account (Line 5), 𝑦’s
requesting goal is part of its mission (Line 6), and 𝑥 is competent
for producing an authoritative account about 𝑢 because this is part
of its mission (Line 7). Agent 𝑦 has the permission to ask for an ac-
count only when such a request is part of its mission, and condition
𝑟 holds. In NPL this can be expressed by means of the following
two norms: one that prohibits 𝑦 to ask for a report when the con-
text does not hold, and another that prohibits 𝑦 to ask when the
requesting goal does not belong to its mission.
1 norm nContextNotHold ing :
2 a c c oun t ab i l i t yAg r e emen t ( Request_u , Account_u , R ) & not R &
3 r e qu e s t ( Request_u , Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) &
4 done ( S , Reques t ing_goa l_u , Y ) &
5 mi s s i on_goa l (M, Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) & committed ( S ,M, Y ) )
6 −> f a i l ( con tex tNotHo ld ing ( Y , Request_u , R ) ) .
The argument of the fail operator, contextNotHolding(Y,
Request_u,R), represents the reason for the failure.
1 norm nRequestNotAl lowed :
2 a c c oun t ab i l i t yAg r e emen t ( Request_u , Account_u , R ) &
3 r e qu e s t ( Request_u , Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) &
4 done ( S , Reques t ing_goa l_u , Y ) &
5 not ( m i s s i on_goa l (M, Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) & committed ( S ,M, Y ) )
6 −> f a i l ( n o t L eg i t ima t eReque s t ( Y , Request_u ) ) .
Robustness. In order to gain robustness, it is necessary that when
an agent𝑥 detects a perturbation about aworkflow 𝑣 it is responsible
for, 𝑥 send an account 𝑣!, about such a perturbation, to the agent
mandated the execution of a recovery strategy. Assuming to have
the accountability A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑣), by Proposition 4 we introduce the
responsibilities R(𝑥, 𝑣) and R(𝑦,𝑢 ∨ ℎ(𝑣!)), where 𝑢 [𝑣]. The former
responsibility just denotes that 𝑥 is in charge of doing 𝑣 . (Note
that agent 𝑥 is also account giver towards 𝑦 about 𝑣 .) The latter
responsibility is attributed to 𝑦, and denotes that 𝑦 is in charge of
workflow 𝑢 including the recovery strategy handling the account
𝑣! in case a perturbation with such an account should affect 𝑣 . To
achieve this result in JaCaMo it is sufficient to define two missions,
one for agent 𝑥 and one for agent 𝑦, mentioning respectively, goal
𝑣 and goal 𝑢 ∨ ℎ(𝑣!), so that 𝑢 [𝑣]. And then, concretize A(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑟, 𝑣)
via a proper set of norms as explained above. The last step toward
robustness is to push 𝑦 to activate the recovery strategy when it
receives the corresponding account. This can be obtained by the
following norm.
1 norm nTreatAccount :
2 a c c oun t ab i l i t yAg r e emen t ( Request_u , Account_u , R ) &
3 r e qu e s t ( Request_u , Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) &
4 account ( Account_u , Account ing_goa l_u ) &
5 r e c o v e r y S t r a t e g y ( Account_u , T rea tment_goa l_u ) &
6 done ( S , Reques t ing_goa l_u , Y ) & done ( S , Account ing_goa l_u , X ) &
7 mi s s i on_goa l (M1 , Reques t i ng_goa l _u ) & committed ( S ,M1 , Y ) ) &
8 mi s s i on_goa l (M2 , Account ing_goa l_u ) & committed ( S ,M2 , X ) ) &
9 mi s s i on_goa l (M3 , Trea tment_goa l_u ) & committed ( S ,M3 , Y ) )
10 −> o b l i g a t i o n ( X , enab l ed ( S , T rea tment_goa l_u ) ,
11 done ( S , Treatment_goa l_u , Y ) , . . . ) .
In words, when a requested account is delivered to the a-taker,
and a recovery strategy is applicable to such an account (see Line 5),
the a-taker, by virtue of its responsibility regarding the associated
treatment task (Line 9), becomes obliged to activate that treatment
task. Such an obligation does not specify what the agent is actually
asked to do to tackle the perturbation. The treatment task is, in
fact, mapped into a local agent goal, as usual. Autonomy is, then,
preserved and the agent will be free to apply the recovery strategy
which suits best the provided account and its expertise.
It is worth noting that, although accountability is a directed re-
lationship between agents, it is realized in JaCaMo by means of
undirected obligations. This happens because in order to realize
accountability, we rely on the organization’s normative system, by
way of concepts like obligations and goals. In other approaches,
such as [6, 18] where agents establish their accountability agree-
ments by way of protocols, it would be possible gain robustness by
relying on social commitments, that differently from obligations,
are always directed from a debtor towards a creditor.
6 RELATEDWORKS AND CONCLUSION
Building upon suggestions from many works, we have defined a
constructive technical framework of accountability (Definition 6)
for supporting the realization of robust multiagent organizations,
and we have illustrated how the framework can be mapped onto
the JaCaMo agent platform. An accountability relationship grants
legitimacy to the a-taker to ask for an account, and to the a-giver
to provide a meaningful account. The legitimacy of the a-giver is
grounded on the structural dimension of accountability, that makes
it a reliable source about events of interest (e.g., perturbations).
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This is the distinctive feature of accountability w.r.t. other social
relationships like business contracts and social commitments, which
only yield obligations to do something (normative dimension). The
proposal features a clear separation of concerns: accountability
agreements anticipate at design time the kinds of perturbation of
interest; how these are actually handled, however, depends on the
specific plans (or behaviors) implemented by the agents, playing
organizational roles (which are known only at runtime). Second,
our mechanism is useful to handle perturbations that cannot be
properly addressed by a single agent. In many cases, the agent that
detects a perturbation is not aware of the global context (e.g., how
the perturbation may indirectly affect tasks of other agents), and
has no power for fixing the problem. On the other hand, the agent
that could handle the perturbation has no access to the situation
where the perturbation has occurred. Accountability is the means
through which an account about a perturbation is reported to the
agent who is responsible for treating that perturbation. In some
way, accountability complements the plan failure mechanism of
JaCaMo (where failure is tackled by an agent locally) because it
enables a sort of escalation of a failure.
This work sets the ground for several future directions. First, it
represents a general schema that can be tailored to specific appli-
cations, e.g., to realize an exception handling mechanism in agent
organizations, by constraining the way in which agents produce
and consume accounts. The current proposal builds robustness on
top of a given distribution of responsibility but we mean to extend
the study to the cases where responsibilities may change along time,
either by effect of the received accounts or due to external circum-
stances; e.g., an agent leaving the organization or a bottleneck that
is identified and solved by splitting some responsibilities among
many agents. Another future direction of work concerns the realisa-
tion of tools that can support the work of actual organizations, like
the mentioned UNDP, by combining accountability frameworks
with oversight policies. This case is more general than the one we
have tackled because accounts will often concern achievements,
and will also allow taking advantage of opportunities.
In software engineering, robustness is considered a key property
of software systems [33], and is usually gained by ensuring (at
design time) that “exceptional” events will be reported to those soft-
ware components which have themeans for handling them properly.
As pinned out in [37], traditional exception handling approaches,
however, do not fit some key characteristics of multiagent systems,
like openness, heterogeneity, agent encapsulation, and distribution.
In particular, they usually assume that software components are
collaborative, and that their code can be inspected while handling
some given exception. But introspection is often impossible when
dealing with agents, and collaboration cannot be given for granted.
[37] suggests that an exception handling mechanism for multiagent
systems should leverage both on the proactivity of agents, and on
the environment in which agents are situated. Nevertheless, a few
authors faced the problem of modeling exceptions in an agent-based
system. Among them, [35] relies on commitment-based protocols,
while [29] proposes an obligation-based approach for exception
handling in interaction protocols.
In [15, 16] the authors explain how, within Socio-Technical Sys-
tems, accountability plays a fundamental role in balancing the
principals’ autonomy: a principal can decide to violate any expecta-
tion for which it is accountable, however, by way of accountability
the principal would be held to account about that violation.
Accountability is recognized as a value for developing software
also in [19], where a proposal complementary to ours is made.
There, the authors focus on answer production in presence of an ac-
countability relationship, tacking questions: how to properly define
the temporal window to consider? Which pieces of information are
relevant in this time interval? Which questions are suitable to be
asked in this setting? The account giving agent produces an answer
in terms of its internal mechanisms. The proposal, however, does
not provide the organizational view of the system of interacting
agents and does not tackle robustness and exceptions.
In [17], accountability enables the process of norms adaptation by
feeding outcomes back into the design-phase. In this approach, the
account is a justification of an agent’s norm-violating behavior. This
is a different understanding of accounts than ours because, for us,
account givers are not rule violators: they meet perturbations, and
provide information about the encountered situations. The account
takers, on their hand, will interpret the received accounts – possibly
combining them with further information provided by other agents
or that simply belongs to the callee’s level. The adaptation process
in [17], that consists in norm modification, however, can be seen
as a kind of robustness. Our objective is different: we do not target
norm modification, but the achievement of the organizational goal
despite the occurrence of perturbations. The two approaches are
not in contrast, rather, they complement each other. They are both
exemplifications of the perspective put forward in [1], for which a
property of a system is robust if it is invariant with respect to a set
of perturbations. The difference lies in the type of perturbations
the two approaches aim at.
Finally, MOCA [7] provides an information model of account-
ability, that captures the kind of facts that must be available to
allow the identification of account-givers in certain situation of
interest. The model is given in Object-Role Modeling (ORM) [30]
due to the relational nature of the represented concepts, and enables
automatic verification of consistency The information model is cen-
tered around two basic concepts: just expectation and control. Just
expectation is intended as the mutual awareness and acceptance of
an accountability relationships between the involved a-giver and
a-taker. Control, instead, is intended as the power, possibly exerted
indirectly by means of other agents, of achieving a condition of
interest. The normative and structural dimensions of accountabil-
ity, that characterize our proposal, respectively capture these two
features. Through the normative dimension, agents are aware of
the obligations they may be subjected as a-givers, and what per-
missions they have as a-takers. The structural dimension, instead,
grounds accountability relationships over an explicit assumption
of responsibility by the agents, that we interpret as a declaration of
direct control.
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